john.morrissey@nuigalway.ie Abstract: When US military commanders refer today to the "long war", they could more instructively refer to the "long war of securitization", involving both practices of war and reconstruction that have always been based on a therapeutic logic of preemption and an endgame of protection from global economic risk. Since the early 1980s, the centrepiece of US foreign policy has been the securitization of the Persian Gulf region, with the newly-created United States Central Command (CENTCOM) given the task of effecting a grand strategy that has subsequently been consistently based on two interrelated tactics: first, the discursive identification and positing of the Persian Gulf as a precarious yet pivotal geoeconomic space, essential to US and global economic health; and secondly the enactment of a dual military-economic securitization strategy to secure, patrol and regulate designated "vital interests" in the region. With the rhetorical power of "risk management" perhaps more palpable today than ever, this paper reflects on the neoliberal discourses of "risk" and "regulation" that sustain a "long war" in which the perennial potentiality of a volatile global political economy necessitates securitization by US military force.
3 initially in this paper is to sketch two crucial CENTCOM tactics in effecting US grand strategy in the Middle East: the first is the discursive production of the Persian Gulf region as a pivotal region vital to US geoeconomic interests; the second is the operation of a military-economic securitization strategy to safeguard those interests and police the functioning of a neoliberal global economy. (Cowen and Smith 2009:32, 34, 43) . For this paper, recognizing and interrogating the neoliberal securitization project at the heart of CENTCOM necessarily involves thinking through how US geopolitical power is solidified by geoeconomic calculation and practice, but what I want to do initially is to discuss briefly the paper's use of the key terms "geoeconomic" and "securitization".
As a theoretical idiom, "geoeconomic" is a relatively recent term but, nevertheless, has had a number of academic manifestations. 2 Though having an earlier incarnation, the phrase "geoeconomics" first popularly emerged in 1990 with the publication of a since frequently referenced
Edward Luttwak article in The National Interest. 3 For Luttwak, geo-economics emerged in the immediate post-Cold War era to reconfigure international relations via the "grammar of commerce"
(1990:17). In optimistically (and of course naively) foreseeing a "displacing" of "military methods"
by economic statecraft, Luttwak argued that "economic regulation" had become a more significant "tool of statecraft" than "military defenses", and posited "geo-economics" as the "neologism" that best described the "admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce" that was beginning to supersede the "strategic priorities and strategic modalities" of the Cold War era (1990:17-19) . As interesting and even compelling as Luttwak's argument is, it has a number of fatal flaws; some of which Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith (2009) have recently underlined. Their most important critique is perhaps their insistence on "the geographical unevenness and radical incompleteness" of the globalized geo-economic world envisioned by Luttwak, and they remind us too that "geoeconomic calculation announced itself much earlier than the 1990s" (Cowen and Smith 2009:38); a point borne out in particular by CENTCOM's emergence being predicated on a postWorld War II US grand strategy that increasingly bonded "military" and "economic" security interests in foreign policy projection.
An additional key problem with Luttwak's thesis is his conceptualization of a universally understood global economic playing field that effectively occludes geography -and moreover the enduring necessity of militarily securing it for "geo-economic practice". Luttwak anticipated the emergence of a style of international relations in the post-Cold War era in which geopolitical and military statecraft would be replaced by a form of geo-economic statecraft wherein "competitively, or cooperatively, the actions on all sides would always unfold without regards to frontiers" (Luttwak 1990:17) . Aside from the obvious charge of abstraction and essentialism here, it is the negation of the import of geography, borders and boundaries that is most spurious in the envisioning of his neoliberal "geo-economic world". As I will argue later, what I am calling the "geoeconomic securitization project" of CENTCOM has long relied, and continues to rely, on a necessary regional ground presence across the Middle East to secure vital "land nodes" that enable military-economic practices of regulation. Returning to CENTCOM, I use the terms "geoeconomic" and "geoeconomics" neither in the sense of Luttwak-ian "geo-economics" nor Mackinder-esque "geopolitics" but rather to theorize how a political economy "regulatory function" of US military involvement in the Persian Gulf featured centrally in the emergence of a logic of intervention, and indeed preemption, that came to dominate formulations of US foreign policy in the region since at least the late 1970s. The terms are employed, in other words, to divulge the US military's discursive production of a critically important regional geography defined by its dual "military-economic security interests". And as I outline later, that particular geography and the identified "vital interests" therein were not only geographed as pivotal for a US-centred global political economy but were also scripted as precarious, volatile and therefore in need of "securitization" -by CENTCOM.
Randy Martin (2007:19) has outlined "securitization" as "far from being a reduction of polity to economy" but rather as "an intricate affiliation between the two" (Martin, 2007: 19 In theorizing CENTCOM's mission, then, I am arguing that the command's grand strategy has always been conceived and mobilised for the securitization of both "military" and "economic"
interests. Attaining this endgame has revolved around a discursively entwined security and geoeconomic discourse of risk that legitimizes a strategic argument for the necessity of military interventionism. And that interventionism has now taken on a look of permanency that has been achieved by the perpetual scripting of CENTCOM's "Central Region" as pivotal for the effective functioning and regulation of the global political economy -for both the present and the near future. Dalby so usefully puts it, "the invocation of supposed geographical verities" is used to "denigrate other peoples" and "justify violence". 5 To this end, many have underlined the geoeconomic calculation at the heart of contemporary US foreign policy and traced its historical gestation to the current war on terrorism ( CENTCOM's overt framing of its primary geoeconomic mission to secure "vital U.S.
interests" has been somewhat rolled back in recent years. Shaping the Central Region for the 21st
Century outlined CENTCOM's foremost goal to "[p]rotect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability". 8 Ten years later, its 2009 mission statement, however, signals a more universalist agenda, presenting the notion of US-led international "cooperation" and "development" and erasing explicit references to US "national interests":
US Central Command, working with national and international partners, promotes development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability. This purposeful discursive shift to orientate a more universalist neoliberal mission has everything to do with garnering international support for the US-led "war on terrorism" of course. It reflects too the long-established prowess and creative flexibility of US military communications strategy. 10 However, the new mission statement does not depart from CENTCOM's foundational remit of geoeconomic securitization of volatile yet vital strategic spaces for the good of the US and global political economy. This has always been, and continues to be, the "mission géoéconomique".
Insecurity, Risk and the Temporality of Preemption: CENTCOM's Aleatory Contract
The aleatory nature of the Middle East's future has long been a key discursive touchstone of CENTCOM geopolitical discourse. Since its initiation in the early 1980s, the command's strategy The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: it contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow.
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President Carter emphasised the "potentially grave situation" in the Middle East and made the case for the necessity of "resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come". 12 He was, in effect, sketching the idea of preemptive military action and a "long war". CENTCOM's theater strategy of deterrence built strongly on well-established military maxims honed during the Cold War. Deterrence continued to feature at the heart of US foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and it comprised both a discursive production of defense and prevention rhetoric, and an active operational war-fighting strategy (Klein 1988 (Klein , 1989 . And as Bradley Klein (1994:5) points out, the "strategic violence" of deterrence does not "merely patrol the frontiers", it "helps constitute them as well". Klein's reminder is important because Western "interventionary" violence has a long history of being incorporated into liberal discourse by the legitimization of aggression as "exceptional", as "necessary", as "allowable". As Klein argues, Western imperial and geopolitical violence "draws upon a variety of discursive resources that are themselves widely construed as rational, plausible and acceptable", and chief among these is "a series of apparent opposites" such as "domestic and foreign, inside and outside, order and anarchy, strength" and "consequently, we deter these individuals by continuing to organize, equip, and exercise premier joint and combined forces; positioning a credible mix of those forces forward in the region; maintaining the national will to use them; and communicating our resolve to our opponents". 15 For General Peay, the geostrategic and geoeconomic interests at stake in the region meant that the concept of "withdrawing" was simply "not an option". 16 The concept that did receive particular attention as the US military began to envision its role and capabilities for the 21st century was "rapid troop deployability". A series of reviews of overseas basing strategy and technological capacity for rapid troop movement gradually refocused the US We do have such a plan, and it does not just sit on the shelf gathering dust. We war-game it, we exercise it, and we modify it to meet challenging circumstances. 18 And those plans were indeed quickly operationalized a year earlier during "Operation Vigilant
Warrior", which saw a successful CENTCOM deterrence manoeuvre against Iraq by combining the combat power of forward deployed troops and prepositioned equipment and supplies.
Central Command's focus on deterrence continued in the late 1990s, and both its right, and capacity to do so unilaterally, were well versed by CENTCOM CINCs in their reports to Congress.
In 1999, for example, General Anthony Zinni argued to the Senate Arms Service Committee that the "ability to project overwhelming and decisive military power is key to CENTCOM's theater strategy as well as our ability to shape the battlefield". 19 To this end, strategic air-and sea-lift Reacting to his command's new military medium, then CENTCOM commander General Tommy
Franks proclaimed that CDHQ fulfilled urgently-needed capabilities. 21 The necessary military capabilities identified by General Franks included most importantly the ability to intervene quickly and decisively in any spaces geo-graphed as "in need of securitization" in CENTCOM's AOR. As unilateral such an interventionist position may be, it was nevertheless the fundamental geopolitical touchstone of the Bush administration's war on terror, and one staunchly and endlessly registered.
"The world has changed a great deal", declared President Bush in Cincinnati in August 2004 , and "our posture must change with it", so that "we can be more effective at projecting our strength and The U.S. overseas basing structure must serve both in the near term and for decades to come.
[Bases] cannot be oriented to dealing only with current threats. They must have the capacity to deal with threats that will emerge in decades to come… None of us can predict the future.
That, however, is enough to remind us that any base structuring cannot be designed to deal only with the threats of today. The base structure we develop in the near future must enable us to meet the threats that will emerge over the next quarter century and beyond (2005:iii, 6-7).
The Commission went on to cite the example of "Operation Vigilant Warrior" in 1994 ("to respond to renewed Iraqi aggression against Kuwait") and "Operation Iraqi Hajjar's argument about the import of "land power" is significant I think. Much of the recent work on geoeconomics points to how, as Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith put it, the "acquisition or control of territory" is more of "a tactical option rather than a strategic necessity" in terms broad mission of "neoliberal securitization". 31 In it, the positing of terrorist strategy is juxtaposed in irrational opposition to the security and economic logic of US military strategy:
Extremists use terrorism to impede and undermine political progress, economic prosperity, the security and stability of the international state system... The United States will promote freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity around the world to mitigate those conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. If we were to be driven out of Iraq … extremists could control a key part of the global energy supply… Whatever political party you belong to, whatever your position on Iraq, we should be able to agree that America has a vital interest in preventing chaos and providing hope in the Middle East. 33 Since 1983, US Central Command has been tasked with securitizing the most pivotal geoeconomic space in our contemporary world -what it calls the "Central Region". This paper has shown how that objective has been focused on two essential and seemingly convertible components of American foreign policy: "military" and "economic" security interests. In underlining the link between strategy and economics at the heart of CENTCOM's mission, I have sought especially to highlight the command's neoliberal policing raison d'être. 34 Its role of "geoeconomic regulator", in effect, points us to a conjoined history of military and financial securitization and a preemptive logic of US involvement in the Middle East that has long involved therapeutic discourses of risk management and explicit appeals to neoliberal economic universality. CENTCOM's "long war" is about the strategic-economic alignment of the Persian Gulf region for the good of the international community; it is a war of "insurance-risk securitization" for an aleatory future requiring permanent military interventionism; and it is a war enacted by military-economic practices of regulation that sees the "policing" of Gulf assets, the preemptive "deterrence" of regional rivals and ultimately the geopolitical and geoeconomic "shaping" of the most energy-rich region on earth. 
